In Rive90] the MD4 message digest algorithm was introduced taking an input message of arbitrary length and producing an output 128-bit message digest. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to produce any message having a given prespeci ed target message. In this paper it is shown that if the three round MD4 algorithm is stripped of its rst round, it is possible to nd for a given (initial) input value two di erent messages hashing to the same output. A computer program implementing this attack t a k es about 1 millisecond on a 16 Mhz IBM PS/2 to nd such a collision.
Introduction
The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm, by Ronald L. Rivest and RSA Data Security, Inc., is intended for le hashing: it accepts arbitrarily large inputs and produces an output of 128 bits. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to produce any message having a given prespeci ed target message digest. The MD4 algorithmis designed to be quite fast on 32-bit machines.
An interesting topic of investigation is how these claims relate to the number of rounds of MD4, and whether they hold for a weaker version of the algorithm, stripped of its rst or last round. The latter was considered by Ralph Merkle Merk90], who showed that skipping the last round jeopardizes the strength of the system: for 99.99% of all initial values it is possible to nd two message di ering in only 3 bits, which are hashed to the same output value. We derived an algorithm for it and wrote a computer program implementing the attack. The program takes less than a millisecond on a 16 Mhz IBM PS/2 to nd such a collision. Next, we i n vestigated whether by skipping the rst round one would also be able to produce a collision of messages. It will be shown that it is indeed possible for MD4 stripped of its rst round to nd for a given (initial) input value two di erent messages hashing to the same output.
In Section 2 a short description of MD4 is given. In Section 3 the attack on the last two rounds is explained, and an example collision for MD4 skipping the rst round is given. The possibility to extend this attack to the full three round algorithm is brie y discussed.
Short description of MD4
Below only a general description of the MD4 message digest algorithm is given. For a detailed description the reader is referred to Rive90]. In this description a byte is de ned as an 8-bit quantity a n d a word as a 32-bit quantity. A sequence of bits can be interpreted as a sequence of bytes, where each consecutive group of 8 bits is interpreted as a byte with the high-order bit of each b yte listed rst. Similarly, a sequence of bytes can be interpreted as a sequence of words, where each consecutive group of 4 bytes is interpreted as a word with the low-order byte given rst. The input and output of MD4 is considered to be a sequence of bytes, not words, but the internal operations of the algorithm are word oriented.
The MD4 recipe for a b-bit message consists of the following steps:
1. Append padding bits and the message length: a single \1" bit, l ; 1 z e r o bits (1 l < 512) and the 64-bit representation of b mod 2 64 are appended to the message such that the length b+l+64 of the extended message is a multiple of 512. The 64 bits containing the message length are appended as two 3 2 -b i t w ords, loworder word rst in accordance with the previous conventions. The (new) will be equal too, and if (A 28 B 28 C 28 D 28 ) has the same value for both messages, both messages are hashed to the same output value. The two message blocks only di er in the remaining 8 words X 1], X 5], X 9], X 13], X 2], X 6], X 10] and X 14] used in the middle 8 elementary operations of the last two rounds. The two alternatives for these message words are precisely chosen in such a w ay that the 4-word bu er (A B C D) has two alternatives after 8 and 24 elementary operations (this is halfway the second and third round), but the same value for both messages after 12 and 28 elementary operations. Hence we h a ve t wo di erent messages and a single input value, which a r e hashed to the same output value. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 In what follows we will explain how to nd one set of the above m e n tioned 48 unknown words. In this solution a crucial role is played by the hexadecimal word 55555555, which will be called N. In each block of four equations there is now one equation with only 2 unknowns: (4), (5), (12) and (13). Going up or down within each b l o c k (up in the rst and third, down in the other two) one encounters equations with more and more unknowns. The route to follow is quite obvious now: solve the equations with only 2 unknowns by making a free choice for one of them, and work your way up (or down) the other equations, solving them for the remaining unknowns. (4), (5), (12) and (13) (7) and (10) (2) and (15), and (3) and (14). This set can be easily solved under the same conditions. step 5 This step is no more than an exercise with blanks.
(6) or (11) yields two alternatives of X 6] (7) and (8) The only condition imposed by the attack on the constants of equations (1) to (16) is that all the values of the rotation constants must be odd.
One can (easily) proof that the di erence between two messages produced in this way is constant and equal to 0 ;2N 2N 0 0 ;2N 2N 0 0 ;N N 0 0 ;N N 0 where every number stands for a 32-bit word. A program has been written implementing this attack. With this program it takes about 1 millisecond on a 16 Mhz IBM PS/2 to nd such a collision. As an example, the following pair of 512-bit messages (written as 16 32-bit words, in hexadecimal notation) produces a collision for MD4, as described in Section 2 and using only the last two rounds in the third step of the recipe: To produce such a pair of messages one has altogether 320 bits of freedom. It is conceivable that this freedom can be used to produce identical intermediate values and di erent 512-bit message blocks, producing a collision for the entire algorithm. In addition one could also use the extra freedom of X 0], X 4], X 8] and X 12] (or of X 3], X 7], X 11] and X 15]). However, this does not result in an attack on the complete three round algorithm, since in that case the initial value is not dealt with. 
